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Abstract
We advance the debate about the impact of political disagreement in social networks
on electoral participation by addressing issues of causal inference common in network
studies, focusing on voters’ most important context of interpersonal influence: the
household. We leverage a randomly assigned spillover experiment conducted in the
UK, combined with a detailed database of pre-treatment party preferences and public
turnout records, to identify social influence within heterogeneous and homogeneous
partisan households. Our results show that intra-household mobilization effects are
larger as a result of campaign contact in heterogeneous than in homogeneous partisan
households, and larger still when the partisan intensity of the message is exogenously
increased, suggesting discussion rather than behavioral contagion as a mechanism.
Our results qualify findings from influential observational studies, and suggest that
within intimate social networks, negative correlations between political heterogeneity
and electoral participation are unlikely to result from political disagreement.
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Introduction
In deciding whether to vote in an election, and which party to support, informal political
discussions with family, friends and acquaintances play an important role. These discussions
reinforce social norms, provide us with political information, allow us to understand the
views and reasoning of others and to express –and maybe even persuade others of– our own
views (Conover, Searing and Crewe 2002; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987, 1991; Mutz 2002b,
2006; Sinclair 2012; Zuckerman, Dasović and Fitzgerald 2007). Ultimately they are said to
result in increased political engagement and electoral mobilization (Cutts and Fieldhouse
2009; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Klofstad 2007, 2011, 2015; Lake and Huckfeldt 1998;
McClurg 2003; Rolfe 2012; Sinclair 2012; Zuckerman 2005; Zuckerman et al. 2007).
Consequently, political scientists have long discussed the potential of campaigns to mo-
bilize voters indirectly by encouraging political discussion within personal networks such as
that of the family in the run-up to an election (McClurg 2003; Rolfe 2012). Glaser, for
instance, argued that "the most influential canvassers are the rest of the people in the voter’s
family" and that "if party workers or civic organizations want the greatest return on the use
of their scarce services, they should make contact with the most politicized member of a
household [...] and motivate that member to bring all the other members to the polls" (1959:
570).
But, while studies show a strong relationship between political discussion within personal
networks and political participation (Bond, Fariss, Jones, Kramer, Marlow, Settle and Fowler
2012; Klofstad 2011, 2015; McClurg 2003; Rolfe 2012), there is an unresolved debate about
the extent to which indirect mobilization is dependent on the degree of political agreement
within the network (Bélanger and Eagles 2007; Fitzgerald and Curtis 2012; Huckfeldt, John-
son and Sprague 2002, 2004; Klofstad 2011; Klofstad, Sokhey and McClurg 2013; McClurg
2003, 2006; Mutz 2002a, 2006; Nir 2011; Pattie and Johnston 2009). In an influential series of
observational studies Mutz (2002a; 2002b; 2006), while acknowledging the benefits of mixed
political company for political tolerance, has expressed concerns about the correlation be-
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tween network heterogeneity and electoral abstention. Her findings suggest that there might
be a flipside to increasing tolerance, a demobilizing, "dark side of mixed political company"
(Mutz 2006, 89). On the other hand, studies such as those conducted by Huckfeldt and
colleagues (2002; 2004), Nir (2005) and McClurg (2006) dispute the demobilizing impact of
disagreement within a network.
The literature on network heterogeneity and political participation has faced difficulty
in making strong causal inferences (Fowler, Heaney, Nickerson, Padgett and Sinclair 2011;
Klofstad 2007, 2011; Mutz 2006). Findings from studies relying on randomized campaign
experiments, which allow for stronger causal inferences, support the notion of indirect mo-
bilization through small, personal networks by showing that conversations with campaign
volunteers not only mobilize the contacted individual, but also their household members –a
phenomenon that is called "spillover" (Nickerson 2008; Sinclair 2012; Sinclair, McConnell
and Green 2012). Yet, spillover experiments have not addressed the potential consequences
of political (dis)agreement for intra-household mobilization. In addition, these experiments
have exclusively relied on non-partisan mobilization messages, notwithstanding the partisan
nature of most campaigns. This while the partisan intensity of mobilization messages likely
impacts mobilization among members of a household differently depending on whether they
are politically like-minded or non-like-minded.
In this paper we integrate the literature on political homo-and heterogeneity in social
networks and the experimental literature on indirect campaign mobilization. We focus on
what is arguably the most important context of interpersonal influence for voters: the house-
hold (Cutts and Fieldhouse 2009; Fieldhouse and Cutts 2012; Nickerson 2008; Sinclair et al.
2012; Stoker and Jennings 1995; Zuckerman et al. 2007). While there is a high congruence
between household members’ party and policy preferences (Stoker and Jennings 2005), still
no more than an estimated 40-60 percent of two-voter households can be described as polit-
ically homogeneous in partisan terms (Bélanger and Eagles 2007; Johnston, Jones, Propper,
Sarker, Burgess and Bolster 2005; Zuckerman, Fitzgerald and Dasović 2005). We ask to what
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extent intra-household mobilization during an election campaign is conditioned by both the
degree of heterogeneity of party preferences within the household, and the partisan intensity
of a campaign message. We focus on two-voter households, the majority of which is likely to
consist of family members, in particular couples. Following Huckfeldt et al. (2004) we con-
ceptualize disagreement as partisan disagreement (for a discussion, see Klofstad et al. 2013).
Instead of relying on only one network member’s report of the extent of partisan disagree-
ment in their network, though, we use the self-reported party preference of each household
member, thus reducing the systematic biases in respondents’ perceptions (Klofstad et al.
2013; Osborn and Mendez 2011).
Our research design combines data from a previously conducted randomized campaign
experiment in the United Kingdom (UK), which includes information on the party pref-
erences of household members, with validated turnout data from the official voter register
on both assigned subjects and those household members excluded from the original exper-
iment. We conduct an implicit mediation analysis (Gerber and Green 2012) by utilizing
campaign messages of different partisan intensity that manipulate the potential for partisan
disagreement within heterogeneous and homogeneous households, and assess their impact on
turnout. Our results show that intra-household mobilization effects are larger as a result of
campaign contact in households that consist of individuals who hold competing party pref-
erences, and larger still when the partisan intensity of the message is increased. Thus, we
find no evidence in support of a demobilizing impact of disagreement. In contrast, partisan
disagreement within the confined space of the household might be beneficial for encouraging
political debate and ultimately participation.
Social Influence in Partisan Households
Early voting studies established the importance of political discussion within personal net-
works for voting behavior (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse,
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Miller and Stokes 1960; Downs 1957; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1948). Ever since
these early studies there has been a debate about the importance of the nature of the net-
work (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948). Currently, an important aspect of this debate concerns the
question whether discussion is more likely in networks that consist of politically like-minded
or non-like-minded individuals, and how this so-called network homo- and heterogeneity
(Mutz 2006) ultimately impacts on political participation.
It is important to note that much of this current debate does not explicitly address
households (see for notable exceptions: Bélanger and Eagles 2007; Bello and Rolfe 2014).
Yet, family or household members are regularly named as the most important or frequent
discussion partners (Mutz 2006, 126; Sinclair 2012, 27). Couples have been shown to influence
each other, to become more similar in their party preferences (Stoker and Jennings 2005;
Verba, Schlozman and Burns 2005; Zuckerman et al. 2007), and to exhibit similar levels of
turnout (Glaser 1959; Straits 1990; Verba et al. 2005).
Mutz (2002a; 2006) shows that individuals in heterogeneous networks are less likely to
participate in politics, and argues that this is due to the experienced cross-pressures resulting
from the diverging political views within the network. Specifically, Mutz (2006) suggests that
there might be two, inter-connected, psychological processes at work. First, membership in
a politically heterogeneous network may lead to internal ambivalence regarding one’s own
political position. This ambivalence, in turn, might lead to negative participation decisions.
Second and most importantly, because individuals try to maintain social harmony within
their personal networks by pleasing all members they avoid discussion of divisive political
issues, which in turn discourages participation. An additional potential mechanism, discussed
by Huckfeldt et al. (2004, 7) builds on Downs’s (1957) argument that individuals seek out
discussion partners within their personal networks that are well-informed and have similar
political viewpoints as their own as a means to obtain low-cost information. Consequently,
this mechanism also suggests that political disagreement within personal discussion networks
is avoided, albeit inadvertently.
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When it comes to households, it is certainly plausible that these processes work similarly.
Maintaining social harmony might be particularly important with those with whom we live
under one roof, and unlikely to be jeopardized over political issues that are of limited interest
to the majority of individuals (Mutz 2006, 106). In addition, we might avoid political
discussion with household members if we do not perceive them as politically agreeable,
and therefore useful, sources of information. Among the few observational studies that
have looked explicitly at households, there is some empirical support for the notion that
individuals in homogeneous – all-Democratic or all-Republican – households are indeed more
likely to vote than those in households in which members differ in their party registration
(Bélanger and Eagles 2007).
On the other hand, exactly because the household tends to constitute our most intimate
personal network, it can arguably endure a substantial amount of disagreement when it
comes to issues that do not directly affect personal relationships between family members
(Morey, Eveland and Hutchens 2012). In fact, political discussions might be difficult to avoid
with people with whom one interacts so frequently, often occurring as by-products of sharing
the same household, and certainly not as easy to shun as unwelcome TV channels or online
news sites. Like with sports, we might enjoy discussing and watching a game with household
members even if we support different teams.
The expectation that individuals who live in politically heterogeneous households are
able to disagree without being disagreeable is also based on the observation that individuals
in heterogeneous networks are more tolerant to other political viewpoints than individuals in
homogeneous discussion networks (Mutz 2002b; 2006). Indeed, Mutz’s (2002b) findings that
political discussion and political tolerance is higher in heterogeneous networks appears to
stand in contrast to a theory that would expect household members to disengage from politics
in order to avoid conflict and confrontation. Bello and Rolfe (2014) show that Mutz’s (2002b)
finding also generalizes to the UK, and specifically to the household. Moreover, Klofstad
(2011) shows that social intimacy (trust) strengthens the relationship between discussion
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and civic participation.
Not only might political discussion be as frequent in heterogeneous as in homogeneous
households, there are reasons to suspect it might be more frequent. Bello and Rolfe (2014)
show that not only are "[s]pouses and family members [...] more likely to be retained as
political discussants than other friends, even close friends", "respondents are more likely to
continue discussing politics with spouses who hold different political views when compared
to spouses who hold the same view" (Bello and Rolfe 2014, 141). This might be because,
given the already high level of homophily in terms of socioeconomic characteristics and
the living environment, discussing with a household member who thinks differently about
politics provides a more effective means of gaining additional information about an upcom-
ing election than talking to a co-partisan. Alternatively, within the context of an election
campaign, political disagreement might create a situation of friendly competition between
household members that leads to higher levels of political engagement, and ultimately elec-
toral participation. Politically interested individuals – often partisans – are more likely to
discuss politics, even though this increases the probability of political disagreement, because
they simply enjoy political discussion (Huckfeldt and Mendez 2008). Competition between
household members might therefore either increase electoral participation indirectly through
fostering political discussion, or directly increase turnout if household members decide to
"counter-mobilize", voting for the opposing candidate in order to "cancel out" the vote of
their household member (Straits 1990, 64-65; Wolff 2002, 33).
The Challenge of Making Causal Inferences
One of the major challenges of research on the impact of network diversity on political partic-
ipation is separating self-selection into politically like-minded personal discussion networks,
and contextual influences, from social influence within networks (Fowler et al. 2011; Klofstad
2007, 2011; Manski 1993). Self-selection can occur when characteristics of individuals impact
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both the level of heterogeneity in their discussion network and their level of political partic-
ipation (Mutz 2006, 115; Bélanger and Eagles 2007, 850). For instance, individuals who are
more politically interested or have stronger partisan preferences might be more likely to par-
ticipate as well as to surround themselves with like-minded discussion partners (Mutz 2006,
115). Contextual influences occur when the external environment has a similar, exogenous,
impact on all members of a network – for example a political campaign could change network
members’ political views and participation rates in the same direction, without individuals
influencing each other (Manski 1993; Fowler et al. 2011, 450).
A few studies have exploited the benefits of panel data (Bello and Rolfe 2014) or statisti-
cal techniques such as propensity score matching (Klofstad et al. 2013) for causal inference.
While certainly an improvement on earlier correlational work, such studies do not fully re-
solve the issue of separating self-selection and contextual influences from social influence
as they do not overcome the issue of unobserved individual or contextual-level confounders
(Arceneaux, Gerber and Green 2006; Wooldridge 2010). For example, when it comes to
campaign-induced discussion, homogeneous partisan households might have a higher prob-
ability of being contacted by election campaigns than heterogeneous partisan households
because the former provide the opportunity to mobilize several potential party supporters
with one contact.
A handful of scholars has conducted studies in which households are randomly allocated
to be contacted by non-partisan campaigns, ensuring that households exposed to such an
external shock are in expectation the same as households that are not (Nickerson 2008; Sin-
clair 2012; Sinclair et al. 2012). Differences in the outcome of interest should consequently
be due to social influence within the household, and not to pre-existing compositional and
contextual differences between households. These randomized field experiments have shown
that turnout levels among household members are significantly higher because their fam-
ily members were contacted by election campaigns, confirming that contagion of campaign
7
messages indeed occurs (idem).1
Contribution and Limitations
While randomized spillover experiments have contributed much to our understanding of the
household as the most important location for intra-personal mobilization, the household itself
has remained a "black box" for experimentalists (Fowler et al. 2011; Nickerson 2008; Sinclair
et al. 2012). Field experiments have neither been able to distinguish between households
according to the composition of their members’ pre-existing partisan preferences, nor have
they been able to ascertain the impact of (discussions about) explicitly partisan campaigns on
electoral mobilization, as all spillover experiments have been based on non-partisan campaign
interventions.
The contribution of this study lies in addressing these omissions. By utilizing a spillover
experimental design we are able to separate selection effects and pre-existing contextual
differences from social influence in assessing to what extent intra-household mobilization
occurs as a result of an election campaign. Subsequently, we test whether such mobiliza-
tion is conditioned by the degree of heterogeneity of party preferences within the household.
We perform an implicit mediation analysis (Gerber and Green 2012, 333-336) by randomly
assigning one of two campaign messages of varying partisan intensity, hence further manipu-
lating the potential for discussion between household members. Our argument is that overtly
partisan messages exacerbate partisan sentiment compared to more neutral messages, mak-
ing pre-existing partisan disagreement within the household more salient. In part this might
be because overtly partisan messages function as a social identity cue, rallying support for
the team and pitting party supporters against each other (Green, Palmquist and Schickler
2002; Rogers, Fox and Gerber 2014). An overview of our study variables and hypothesized
1Based on a natural experiment that exploits random assignment to college dorm rooms, Klofstad (2007;
2011; 2015) also provides evidence of social influence by showing that being randomly exposed to political
discussion leads to increased civic and political participation in and after college.
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relationships is shown in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
While our study thus allows for a unique contribution to both the literatures on social
network composition and on voter mobilization, it is important to point out its limitations.
First, although our study design allows us to identify the causal impact of campaign con-
tact on intra-household mobilization within both heterogeneous and homogeneous partisan
households, we prime, but do not randomly assign partisanship within households. Conse-
quently, we cannot exclude the possibility that compositional partisan differences might be
confounded by a number of (un)observable background attributes. Individuals in hetero-
geneous partisan households might, for instance, be –ex ante– less likely to participate in
politics than individuals who live in homogeneous partisan households. While we therefore
cannot claim that the conditional effects that we uncover are causal in nature, we utilize
information about turnout behavior in multiple previous elections to estimate the effects net
of ex ante turnout differences between heterogeneous and homogeneous households.
Second, we share the limitation present in the experimental and observational literature
that we cannot conclusively show that contagion within households is a result of actual
discussion (Fowler et al. 2011, 463; Nickerson 2008). As Bullock, Green and Ha (2010) have
demonstrated, it is almost impossible to identify a causal mediator, even if a direct measure
of discussion was available in our dataset. Hence, we must acknowledge the possibility of
alternative explanations for any indirect mobilization effects identified in our experiment
that may occur in the (near) absence of discussion. Household members might simply have
listened in on the experimental subject’s telephone conversation with the party volunteer
and adjusted their behavior accordingly. Alternatively, they might have felt social pressure
after observing the experimental subject going out to vote, or they might have considered
the lower costs of voting by going to the polls together (Nickerson 2008, 55). Most of these
alternative mechanisms, however, differ in their observable implications. In the latter two
9
scenarios in particular, there would be little reason to expect different levels of indirect
mobilization depending on whether the household is homo- or heterogeneous, or depending
on the partisan intensity of the campaign message.
A third limitation concerns the question of generalizability (Fowler et al. 2011, 466). The
mobilization messages used in our study were communicated by a local Labour Party. Work
by Jost and colleagues suggests that individuals who hold conservative ideologies are more
likely to avoid situations that arouse cognitive dissonance and less likely to be open to new
experiences and arguments than liberals (Carney, Jost, Gosling and Potter 2008; Garrett
2009; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski and Sulloway 2003; Nam, Jost and Bavel 2013). Consistent
with this idea, Mutz (2006, 33) shows that conservatives are less likely to be embedded in
cross-cutting political discussion networks than liberals. Consequently, we cannot exclude
the possibility that conservatives might be less responsive to a Labour campaign message
than Labour supporters to a Conservative campaign message. Moreover, within the house-
hold conservatives might be less likely to share opinion-challenging messages with Labour
supporters than vice versa. Hence, we would expect indirect mobilization effects to be more
pronounced if contact was made by a Conservative campaign and mediated by a subject who
has liberal leanings than the other way around. Our focus on campaign contact also means
that our findings might not generalize to other settings in which political discussion is likely
to occur within the household, such as when watching news programs together.
Finally, although households are important locations of social interaction, they are also
unique because personal relationships between household members are usually stronger and
may therefore withstand political disagreement more easily than ties that exist between
colleagues or acquaintances. This study therefore seeks to qualify, but not directly contradict
the empirical findings of previous work such as Mutz’s (2006), whose data on cross-cutting
exposure includes weak ties such as those formed at the workplace or in places of worship.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the household is arguably the most important per-
sonal discussion network and hugely influential in our turnout decisions. By examining the
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conditions under which campaign-induced partisan disagreement between household mem-
bers translates into turnout, we aim to shed some light on intra-household mobilization,
and to more closely integrate, and make valuable contributions to, the literatures on social
network composition and campaign mobilization.
Research Design
We rely on a previously conducted randomized campaign experiment to identify mobilization
effects between household members in two-voter households, and to gauge the extent to
which they are conditioned by both the degree of heterogeneity of party preferences within
the household and the partisan intensity of the campaign messages. We conducted this
campaign experiment in several electoral wards in the British city of Birmingham in the
context of the West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) election, which was
held on November 15th 2012.2 This campaign experiment combined two design innovations
that make it especially well-suited for our current study.
First, the experiment was conducted in co-operation with a local Labour Party. Existing
field experimental studies of interpersonal influence within households have so far exclusively
relied on identifying spillover effects of non-partisan Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) interven-
tions. When trying to assess the impact of an election campaign on indirect mobilization
within households, working from within a party’s campaign mimics reality more closely given
that most mobilization efforts tend to be partisan in nature. As we discuss below, phone
bank volunteers were instructed to use two different messages: one of low and one of high
partisan intensity. This difference allows us to identify how varying the potential for partisan
disagreement affects intra-household mobilization.
Second, we had access to detailed information on the pre-treatment party preferences of
both household members. This information was included in the Labour Party’s extensive
2For a detailed description of the data, see the Replication Data Codebook, available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ZFLG25.
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targeting database, and is based on prior canvassing efforts conducted by party volunteers
in the constituency.3 The party aims to contact every voter living in the parliamentary con-
stituency to find out which party he or she supports. It is common practice for constituents
to volunteer their voting intentions to party canvassers in the UK. The database covered
around 38% of registered voters. Although the accuracy of the pre-treatment party support
measure obtained through local Labour Party canvassing is difficult to assess, a comparison
to City Council election results suggests that neither Labour supporters, nor supporters of
rival parties are overrepresented in the data (Supporting Information, Table A7).4 In addi-
tion to party preference, the database also provided information on gender, year of birth,
whether individuals were registered as postal voters, the electoral ward in which they reside,
and individuals’ validated turnout histories (as available from public records). This extensive
set of covariates allows us to check whether our findings are robust to covariate adjustment.
Experimental Assignment
To fulfill the non-interference assumption (SUTVA), we randomly selected one individual
per household included in the electoral database to be part of the original experiment. The
household members of these experimental subjects were not assigned to receive any treat-
ment. For random assignment, a total of 13,065 households with landline numbers (of which
5,190 were two-voter households) were first stratified into three blocks based on the lat-
3We were provided with access to a fully anonymized version of the database that included all registered
voters with available landline or mobile phone numbers, gained informed consent from the Constituency
Labour Party to conduct this experiment, and approval from the internal review boards of both authors’
universities.
4For the purpose of a separate field experiment conducted elsewhere (Foos 2015, chapter 3), one of us
validated the party support measure used in this study with a comparable measure obtained from indepen-
dently conducted phone interviews on a sample of rival party supporters. Interviews with subjects classified
as rival party supporters showed that 72% of respondents in the untreated control group were correctly
classified. Only 9% classified as rival party supporters by canvassers told interviewers that they supported
the Labour Party or a Labour candidate instead.
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est recorded party preference of the experimental subject: ‘Labour’ supporter, ‘rival party’
supporter (i.e. Conservative, Liberal Democrat, Green, BNP, Respect, UK Independence
Party, or those who otherwise indicated to explicitly oppose Labour), and those who were
‘unattached’ to a party or whose latest recorded party preference was unknown (i.e. ‘won’t
say’, ‘don’t know’, ‘non-voter’ or ‘missing’). The choice of these three groups was moti-
vated by the design of the original experiment, which aimed to distinguish Labour from rival
party supporters. Homogeneous partisan households are accordingly defined as households
that either include two Labour voters or two rival party supporters; heterogeneous parti-
san households as consisting of one Labour and one rival party supporter; and unattached
households as consisting of at least one unattached voter.5 Next, for two-voter households,
experimental subjects (and their household members) were, within each partisan group, ran-
domly assigned to either one of two treatment groups or to the control group. The control
group did not receive any form of contact from the campaign. An overview of the random
assignment within partisan blocks for two-voter households is shown in Figure 2.
[Figure 2 about here]
We followed standard randomization inference procedure (Gerber and Green 2012) to
check if any covariate imbalances in our sample of two-voter households were larger than
expected given random sampling variability. The resulting p-value of .50 indicates that
we cannot reject the sharp null hypothesis that the covariates taken together are not sys-
tematically related to treatment assignment of the household member. Detailed balance
5Among rival party supporters in our sample, 49% indicated support for the Conservative Party, less
than 5% explicitly mentioned the name of another party or of an independent candidate, and 47% stated
to be ‘against’ Labour. The latter are most likely Conservative supporters or, alternatively, supporters
of another right-wing party. This means that we cannot exclude the possibility that some homogenous
partisan households consisting of two rival party supporters are actually heterogeneous. In the analysis
section we demonstrate that our findings remain robust when distinguishing homogenous Labour households
from households consisting of two rival party supporters.
13
tables and figures can be found in the Supporting Information (Table A1, and Figure A1).
Furthermore, as we would expect given that turnout data is collected from the public reg-
ister, missing outcome data for any household member is neither systematically related to
treatment assignment alone, nor is it a function of treatment assignment, pre-treatment co-
variates and the interaction between treatment assignment and covariates (Figure A2 in the
Supporting Information).
In order to estimate the within household spillover effects resulting from the two treat-
ments, we compare turnout among unassigned household members living with subjects who
were assigned to one of the two treatment conditions to turnout among unassigned household
members living with subjects assigned to the control condition. In doing so, our spillover
model relies on the common assumption that effects spill over within households, but not
between neighboring households. This assumption has been tested and confirmed in previous
field experiments (Sinclair et al. 2012) and we have no reason to believe that it was violated
in the context of our experiment.
Treatments
Experimental subjects allocated to the two treatment groups were called by telephone by
Labour Party volunteers in the week leading up to the election (November 10th – 15th), and
were encouraged to vote in the PCC election on November 15th 2012. Phone bank volunteers
were entirely blind to subjects’ pre-treatment party preferences, and were instructed to ask
to speak to the person in the experimental group before delivering the messages. In case
the person was unavailable, volunteers were instructed to politely finish the conversation
without revealing the intent of the call.
In formulating the message scripts, we worked closely with the local Labour Party in
order to ensure the messages paralleled normal campaign efforts. Both messages provided
practical information to subjects on the election date and their local polling station, and
encouraged them to vote for the same candidate, providing information about the candidate’s
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background and his most important policy stance (opposition to cuts in police numbers).
However, the content of the scripts varied drastically across the two treatment groups. The
‘high partisan intensity’ treatment was formulated in a strongly partisan tone, explicitly
mentioning the Labour Party and policies multiple times, while taking an antagonistic stance
toward the main rival party, the Conservative Party, by pointing out the Labour candidate’s
opposition to the "Tory cuts" in police numbers. In contrast, the ‘low partisan intensity’
treatment message avoided all statements about party competition, and mentioned neither
the candidate’s party affiliation, nor the rival party. Both message scripts are displayed in
Figures A3 and A4 in the Supporting Information.
Campaign volunteers were asked to fill in a form on whether contact with the targeted
individual was made, any reasons for why contact had failed (i.e. answering machine, no
answer, hang-up, etc.), and the number of call-backs made. After the election the local
Labour Party provided us with an updated version of the (anonymized) database, which
included validated turnout data for the PCC election from the marked electoral register
for both the experimental subjects and their household members. Before the analysis, all
two-voter households with missing outcome data were removed from the sample.
We took great care in the parallel administration of both treatments. The total contact
rate, defined as the percentage of individuals in the respective treatment groups who an-
swered the phone when called by volunteers, among two-voter households, is 45% for both
treatment groups (Table 1). Thus, we failed to administer the treatment to 55% of those
assigned to treatment. This rate of noncompliance is similar to the rate recorded in other
GOTV studies in the UK (John and Brannan 2008).
Analysis and Results
We start by examining to what extent low and high partisan intensity phone messages
mobilized experimental subjects and their household members. Table 1 shows turnout rates
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for experimental subjects and their household members assigned to the control group and to
the two treatment groups. These rates are shown by experimental block, meaning conditional
on the pre-treatment party preference of the assigned subject.
The final column shows that turnout rates among subjects assigned to the control group
and their unassigned household members are almost identical at around 19-20 percent. We
would expect this given the stratified random sampling procedure used to allocate one sub-
ject per household to the experimental sample. Among subjects assigned to receive either a
low or high partisan intensity phone call turnout reaches 22-23 percent. Turnout among the
household members of these subjects is slightly higher at 24 percent. Using randomization-
inference (Aronow and Samii 2012; Gerber and Green 2012) to estimate p-values and con-
fidence intervals, we find that, for all partisan groups combined, both the direct and the
indirect Intent-to-Treat (ITT) effects are statistically different from the respective control
groups with p < 0.05. The results also suggest that both the low and high partisan intensity
campaign messages resulted in intra-household mobilization. As we would expect, Table A2
in the Supporting Information shows that the estimates are robust to covariate-adjustment.
[Table 1 about here]
We next test whether the rates of intra-household mobilization differ significantly be-
tween homogeneous and heterogeneous partisan households. Figure 3a displays the changes
in the predicted probabilities of turnout for unassigned subjects as a function of the treatment
assignment of their household member, conditional on the partisan composition of the house-
hold. The predicted probabilities are based on a logistic regression of turnout on treatment
assignment of the household member, the partisan composition of the household, the in-
teraction between treatment assignment and household partisan composition, pre-treatment
covariates and the interaction between pre-treatment covariates and treatment assignment
(see equation 14 and Table A3, Model III in the Supporting Information).
[Figure 3 about here]
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The key result is that intra-household mobilization effects are stronger, not weaker,
in households where individuals support different parties. While indirect mobilization ef-
fects are around 3.5 percentage-points in homogeneous partisan households and around 7
percentage-points in households with at least one unattached voter, spillover effects in hetero-
geneous partisan households peak at around 15 percentage-points. Although we are dealing
with a treatment-by-covariate interaction, this relationship remains unchanged regardless of
whether we adjust for pre-treatment individual and compositional differences in age, gender,
place of residence, registration type (postal voter or not), and turnout history (see models I -
III in Table A4 in the Supporting Information). Moreover, Figure 3b shows that our results
are robust to further breaking down the homogeneous partisan household category into ho-
mogeneous Labour households and homogeneous rival party households, and the unattached
category into households that include only one unattached subject and households in which
both members are unattached.6
What do these results tell us? We find no evidence to support the hypothesis that
individuals are more likely to mobilize a co-partisan than a household member who supports
another party as a result of being contacted by the Labour campaign. Although we find
that campaign messages spill over in homogenous households consisting of two Labour Party
supporters or which include an unattached voter, mobilization effects in these households are
no greater than in heterogeneous partisan households. In contrast, we find greater spillover
effects when partisans support different parties.
Interaction Dynamics Between Household Members
The finding that campaign spillover effects appear more pronounced in heterogeneous than
in homogeneous partisan households is difficult to reconcile with a theoretical conception of
household members as conflict avoiders. In what follows we try to further disentangle the
6The marginal changes in predicted probabilities in Figure 3b are based on estimates from model III,
Table A4 in the Supporting Information.
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partisan mobilization dynamics within the household by examining whether spillover is more
or less likely depending on the partisan preferences of both household members.
Figure 4 displays the marginal changes in predicted probabilities resulting from a logistic
regression of turnout on assignment to either of the two treatments, the partisanship of the
experimental subject, the partisanship of her household member and the two- and three-way
interactions between the treatment and the party preferences of both household members.
The model also includes pre-treatment covariates, and interactions between covariates and
the treatment (for estimates see models I-III, Table A5 in the Supporting Information).
[Figure 4 about here]
Figure 4a displays the indirect mobilization effects if the assigned household member
supports a rival party, 4b if the assigned household member supports Labour, and 4c if the
assigned subject is unattached to any party. The rival, Labour and unattached labels listed
on the X-axis refer to the party preference of the unassigned household member.
Figure 4a shows that rival party supporters mobilize Labour supporters if they are con-
tacted by a Labour campaign. Figure 4b also shows that Labour party supporters mobilize
rival party supporters as a consequence of Labour campaign contact. While the effects for
heterogeneous households are noisy due to small sample sizes, they are substantially large,
and seem even more pronounced than indirect mobilization effects between two Labour sup-
porters (although the difference between the two effects is not statistically significant). These
results thus suggest that party supporters discuss campaign messages with their household
members even if a party they oppose initiates contact.
Implicit Mediation Analysis: Does Increasing Partisan Intensity
Affect Spillover?
The previous results demonstrate that within household mobilization plays an important
role in partisan election campaigns and that, in contrast to what a conflict-avoidance mech-
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anism would suggest, heterogeneous partisan households are conducive to indirect campaign
mobilization. We implicitly test the effects of raising the level of partisan discussion within
the household by exploiting the design feature that the partisan intensity of the campaign
message was randomly assigned. Messages with stronger partisan language should exacer-
bate partisan sentiment compared to more neutral messages, making pre-existing partisan
disagreement within the household more salient, and resulting in a higher probability of
partisan discussions in the household.
Table 2 and Figure 5 show the logistic regression estimates and the corresponding pre-
dicted Conditional Complier Average Causal Effects (CACE) comparing outcomes directly
for subjects whose household members answered the high intensity phone call to subjects
whose household members answered the low partisan intensity phone call. Since subjects
included in the original experiment did not know before answering the phone whether they
were about to receive the high or the low partisan intensity call, and compliance is defined
as living in a household where the assigned subject would answer the phone when called, the
share of compliers in the high and the low partisan intensity call groups should, in expecta-
tion, be identical (Gerber, Green, Kaplan and Kern 2010, 302-305). Following Gerber et al.
(2010) this "perfect blindness" assumption can be assessed empirically. If, as in our case,
compliance at 45.4% and 44.8% does not vary as a function of treatment assignment, we can
compare turnout rates for household members of compliers directly to each other (for the
formal assumption, and the corresponding CACE spillover estimator see Equations 23 and
24 in the Supporting Information).
[Table 2 about here]
Across partisan blocks, the results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 confirm that receiving a
high intensity partisan message did not result in significantly lower levels of intra-household
mobilization than receiving a message without partisan content. The relative effectiveness of
the two messages again seems to differ according to the partisan make-up of the household.
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Columns 3, 4 and 5 display the results of models that include interactions between the parti-
san composition of the household and the partisan content of the message. While column 4
shows the estimates from a model unadjusted for compositional differences between homoge-
neous and heterogeneous households, column 5 shows the estimates for a model that includes
interactions between pre-treatment covariates and the treatment. The statistically signifi-
cant interaction terms indicate that increasing the potential for partisan disagreement had a
significantly more positive effect on turnout for household members living in heterogeneous
partisan households than for household members living in homogeneous and unattached
partisan households.
Figure 5 displays the marginal changes in predicted probabilities of turnout for unassigned
subjects based on model V in Table 2. Figure 5b shows a robustness check which compares
heterogeneous households separately to homogeneous Labour households and households in
which both members support rival parties (based on Model V in Table A6 in the Supporting
Information). If partisan discussion is a plausible mediator linking campaign contact to
intra-household mobilization, raising the partisan intensity of the message should increase,
not decrease indirect mobilization effects in heterogeneous households.
[Figure 5 about here]
In line with this expectation, we find that indirect mobilization effects in heterogeneous
households are 35 percentage-points larger among individuals living with someone who re-
ceived a call priming her partisan identity than among subjects whose household members
received a call of low partisan intensity. This substantial, but noisy CACE estimate might
be a function of the low baseline turnout rate, and the relatively small subsample size when
comparing household members of compliers directly to each other. It is hence likely that
we are dealing with an upper bound on the true effect size. Although we therefore cau-
tion against overinterpreting the size of this effect, we clearly do not find any evidence that
would support the notion that priming household members’ party preferences would decrease
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indirect mobilization between subjects who are predisposed to disagree on which party to
support.
Discussion and Conclusion
An increasing number of political scientists view turnout as a social activity, and few doubt
that family, friends and neighbors influence decisions about whether or not to participate po-
litically and who to support (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Klofstad 2011; Mutz 2006; Rolfe
2012; Sinclair 2012; Zuckerman 2005; Zuckerman et al. 2007).The debate within the liter-
ature now centers on whether political disagreement between network members is harmful
or beneficial for political participation. In this paper we contribute to this debate by focus-
ing on a specific, but very common, instance of political disagreement that occurs among
household members in the context of a partisan election campaign and which affects the
decision to vote. Our study is unique because it combines the exogenous assignment of
partisan telephone calls with an unusually rich dataset, made available by a local branch
of the UK Labour Party, which includes the party preferences and validated turnout of all
household members. Our results demonstrate that within household mobilization effects are
considerably larger as a result of campaign contact in households that consist of members
who disagree in their party preference than in households in which members share a similar
party preference.
These results provide an important qualification regarding the role of disagreement in
discouraging electoral participation in the context of the household. Rather than supporting
a demobilizing impact of partisan disagreement, our results offer new, experimental evidence
for the participatory benefits of disagreement that advance on observational work carried
out by Huckfeldt and colleagues (2002; 2004), Nir (2005) and McClurg (2006). Importantly,
our study is the first to causally identify the indirect effects of partisan messages on turnout
in heterogeneous and homogeneous personal networks. We recognize that our findings may
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be limited to the household or other equally intimate settings, and may not apply to social
networks in which ties are weaker, and political discussion more easily avoidable. We have
suggested that because households tend to be high-trust environments, the risk of potential
fallout from political discussion is likely lower than in environments such as the workplace. If
social costs are lower, individuals can more easily enjoy the entertainment value and political
information that discussions about partisan politics provide. As such, our findings qualify,
but do not directly contradict, Mutz’s (2006) earlier work on turnout in heterogeneous net-
works that consist of both strong and weak ties.
How confident are we that this intra-household mobilization is a result of discussion
rather than some other form of social influence? Social influence can occur in a number
of imaginable ways. For instance, observing a household member voting might function
as a simple reminder to vote or it may provide social pressure to comply with a perceived
norm of voting. By showing evidence that campaign messages of a highly partisan nature
increase indirect mobilization in heterogeneous partisan households to a greater extent than
campaign messages of a lower partisan intensity, our findings are suggestive of household
members talking about the message, rather than solely acting as a consequence of observing
their household member’s act of voting. Our assertion that members in two-voter households
do not refrain from partisan discussions in order to avoid conflict is also in line with research
that shows how couples who live together become increasingly similar over time in their
policy and party preferences (Stoker and Jennings 2005; Zuckerman et al. 2005). In order to
adopt each other’s preferences surely couples must be talking.
In addition to the literature on disagreement in social networks, this paper also makes an
important contribution to the literature on partisan election campaigns. While the existence
of an indirect mobilization effect within households has been demonstrated in non-partisan
GOTV experiments (Nickerson 2008; Sinclair et al. 2012), we show that this effect is also
present in partisan campaigns. As Nickerson and colleagues (2006) caution, partisan and
non-partisan campaigns differ in multiple ways, and intra-household partisan dynamics are
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widely expected to influence the effectiveness of indirect campaign mobilization (Huckfeldt
et al. 2004). It remains to be seen to what extent indirect mobilization effects between
partisans are replicated, or even amplified, when conservative parties initiate contact with
supporters of more liberal, rival parties, as liberals are said to be more open to opinion-
challenging information than conservatives (Jost et al. 2003; Nam et al. 2013).
The relatively large spillover effects reported in this paper (cf. Nickerson 2008; Sinclair
et al. 2012) might partly be due to the low-information, low-saliency nature of the election.
Alternatively, it might be a function of the research design. In a recent paper, Mann and
Sinclair (2014) argue that spillover effects might differ depending on whether the low- or
the high-propensity voter in a household is targeted. As a function of our research design,
the lower propensity voter had an equal probability of being assigned to contact as the
higher propensity voter. In contrast, in Nickerson’s (2008) experimental design the higher
propensity voter might have been more likely to self-select into opening the door to the
canvasser. Even if our results are on the high end of the scale, they nonetheless strongly
suggest that partisan election campaigns can have substantial indirect mobilization effects
that should be taken into account when assessing the cost-effectiveness of different voter
mobilization methods.
Our results thus raise intriguing strategic questions for partisan campaigns. Partisans
appear to be more responsive to campaign messages from rival parties if these messages are
mediated by household members than if they are transmitted directly by party canvassers.
Our results suggest that campaigns can indirectly affect the turnout behavior of a rival party’s
supporters via sympathetic household members. Future research should hence investigate
whether a campaign strategy that targets heterogeneous partisan households is prone to be
strategically ineffective by mobilizing votes for opposing parties, or if such a strategy might
be beneficial to parties if contacted supporters persuade their household members to switch
their vote.
Are these results specific to the UK context? We sincerely doubt so. Compared to the
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US, the partisan context in the UK is less polarized, and fewer individuals hold strong party
preferences (Ford 2014; Pattie and Johnston 2010). As such, one might have expected no
difference in intra-household mobilization between households in which members support the
same party and those in which they do not. Our finding that spillover effects are larger as a
result of campaign contact in heterogeneous than in homogeneous partisan households, and
larger still when the partisan intensity of the message is increased, would leads us to expect
an even more pronounced impact of partisan disagreement within households on electoral
participation in the US context.
Political discussion within personal networks is widely believed to go hand in hand with
increasing levels of political knowledge and tolerance of competing political viewpoints, ul-
timately benefiting the functioning of democracies (Conover et al. 2002; Mutz 2002b, 2006).
However, scholars have doubted that these civic characteristics of politically heterogeneous
networks also facilitate political participation (McClurg 2003; Mutz 2002a, 2006). Our paper
shows that political disengagement is not necessarily the flip side of the political diversity
and tolerance fostered by sharing the same household with individuals who hold different
political views. A better understanding of how partisan political disagreement within the
family can motivate voter participation provides valuable insights into the general conditions
under which political discussion in personal networks occurs and under which it generates
civic benefits.
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Table 1: Turnout and Contact Percentages in Treatment and Control Groups
By Partisanship of Assigned Subject
Labour Rival Party Unattached Combined
Assigned Subjects
Turnout Control 25.0 24.1 11.6 19.2
Turnout Low Partisan Intensity 27.2 25.4 17.3 22.6
Turnout High Partisan Intensity 29.6 26.2 14.7 22.4
ITT Low Partisan vs Control 2.2 1.4 5.8** 3.4*
[-3.7, 8.3] [-4.0, 6.7] [2.1, 9.4] [0.6, 6.2]
ITT High Partisan vs Control 4.6 2.1 3.1 3.2*
[-1.5, 10.7] [-3.1, 7.3] [-0.4, 6.9] [0.5, 5.9]
Unassigned Household Members
Turnout Control 24.7 24.7 12.7 19.8
Turnout Low Partisan Intensity 28.3 27.7 19.3 24.4
Turnout High Partisan Intensity 28.2 28.7 16.6 23.6
ITT Low Partisan vs Control 3.5 3.0 6.6*** 4.6**
[-2.4, 9.6] [-2.5, 8.3] [2.7, 10.5] [1.8, 7.5]
ITT High Partisan vs Control 3.4 3.9 3.9* 3.8**
[-2.5, 9.4] [-1.3, 9.2] [0.2, 7.9] [1.0, 6.6]
Contact Rates Low Partisan Intensity 53.6 46.0 39.7 45.4
Contact Rates High Partisan Intensity 47.3 50.4 38.8 44.8
N 1273 1635 2022 4930
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Two-tailed tests based on randomization-inference. Table
excludes subjects in households with missing turnout data. Combined column includes inverse probability
weights accounting for different probabilities of assignment to experimental conditions between blocks.
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Table 2: Logistic Regression Results: CACE of high vs low partisan intensity call on turnout
of unassigned subjects, conditional on household party preferences
I II III IV V
Phone Call -.109 -.154 1.337 1.407 1.824
(.142) (.165) (.687) (.785) (1.364)
Heterogeneous Partisan Reference Group
Homogeneous Partisan -.202 -.687 .688 .256 .406
(.325) (.383) (.581) (.648) (.656)
Unattached -.571 -.648 .399 .363 .534
(.364) (.431) (.604) (.680) (.690)
Heterogeneous x Call Reference Group
Homogeneous x Call -1.437* -1.578 -1.823*
(.716) (.818) (.835)
Unattached x Call -1.606* -1.713* -1.976*
(.719) (.824) (.841)
Covariates No Yes No Yes Yes
Covariates x Call No No No No Yes
N 965
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Based on two-tailed tests. Compliers only. Standard errors in
parentheses. Covariates are turnout in seven previous elections, postal voter, gender, age, and electoral
ward. Includes dummies for experimental blocks.
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Figure 1: Variables and expected relationships
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Figure 2: Experimental Assignment
Landline	  sample	  	  NH=5,190	  
Assigned	  subject:	  	  Labour	  supporter	  NH=1,316	  	  	  
High	  Partisan	  Intensity	  Treatment	  NH=	  285	  	  	  
Low	  Partisan	  Intensity	  Treatment	  NH=	  286	  
Control	  	  NH=745	  	  
Assigned	  subject:	  	  Rival	  party	  supporter	  NH=1,701	  	  	  
High	  Partisan	  Intensity	  Treatment	  NH=377	  	  
Low	  Partisan	  Intensity	  Treatment	  NH=366	  
Control	  	  NH=	  958	  	  	  
Assigned	  subject:	  	  Unattached	  	  NH=2,173	  	  
High	  Partisan	  Intensity	  Treatment	  NH=	  451	  
Low	  Partisan	  Intensity	  Treatment	  NH=	  491	  
Control	  NH=1,231	  
	  
NH	  =	  Number	  of	  Households	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Figure 5: CACE high vs low partisan message conditional on household party preferences
a) Left: 3-group operationalization b) Right: 5-group operationalization
Note: 95% confidence intervals
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1
Direct and indirect treatment effects
The effect of treatment on an individual can be defined as the difference between two
potential outcomes: the outcome if an individual were treated and the outcome (at the
same point in time) if the individual were not treated (Imbens and Rubin 2015; Rubin 1974,
1978; Gerber and Green 2012). By randomly assigning individuals to treatment and control
groups we ensure that the potential outcomes of these groups of subjects are, in expectation,
identical before applying the treatments. Under the three core-assumptions of independence,
excludability and non-interference (SUTVA) (Imbens and Rubin 2015; Rubin 1986, 1980),
the difference in the average outcomes of those subjects assigned to the treatment and those
assigned to the control group will provide an unbiased estimator of the true Intent-to-Treat
(ITT) effect (Gerber and Green 2012).1
Let us say that in every two-voter household h one of two subjects, subject i1 (i1 ∈
{1, ..., N1}), was randomly sampled to be included in the experimental assignment, and
randomly assigned to one of two treatment groups, or to the control group. The second
subject in the household, subject i2 (i2 ∈ {1, ..., N2}), was randomly sampled to be excluded
from experimental assignment. Let Z be the treatment indicator, indicating whether i1 in
household h was assigned to receive a low partisan intensity (Z = 1) or a high partisan
intensity phone call (Z = 2) encouraging subjects to vote in the upcoming election, or to
receive no call, i.e. the control group (Z = 0).
Our binary outcomes of interest, Yi1 and Yi2 are voter turnout. The potential outcomes
for i1 are defined as follows:
If Z = 0, then Yi1(0) = 0 or Yi1(0) = 1
If Z = 1, then Yi1(1) = 0 or Yi1(1) = 1
If Z = 2, then Yi1(2) = 0 or Yi1(2) = 1
Following the discussions in Gerber and Green (2012, chapter 2), and Imbens and Rubin
(2015, chapter 1) the respective direct unit-level causal effects τi1 can then be defined as the
1We estimate the ITT effect rather than the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) because not all subjects
who were assigned to treatment in our experiment actually received the treatment.
2
difference between two potential outcomes:
τ(10),i1 = Yi1(1)− Yi1(0) (1)
τ(20),i1 = Yi1(2)− Yi1(0) (2)
τ(21),i1 = Yi1(2)− Yi1(1) (3)
The direct ITT can be defined as the sum of each of the unit-level treatment assignment
effects τ(10),i1 , τ(20),i1 , and τ(21),i1 divided by N1 (the total number of assigned subjects),
and is equal to the difference in the average potential outcomes under the various treatment
assignment conditions (Gerber and Green 2012). E.g. the ITT effect of assignment to the
low partisan intensity treatment is:
1
N1
N1∑
i1=1
(Yi1(1)− Yi1(0)) =
1
N1
N1∑
i1=1
Yi1(1)−
1
N1
N1∑
i1=1
Yi1(0) (4)
Given random assignment to treatment and control conditions, excludability, and non-
interference, the difference-in-means estimator is, in expectation, an unbiased estimator of
the ITT. If we define m1 as a subsample of N1 consisting of subjects i1 who were assigned to
the low intensity partisan phone call and m2 as a subsample of N1 consisting of subjects i1
who were assigned to the high intensity partisan phone call, then the direct ITT estimator
of the low partisan intensity treatment can be defined as:
ÎTT (10),i1 =
1
m1
m1∑
i1=1
Yi1(1)−
1
N1 − (m1 +m2)
N1∑
i1=(m1+m2+1)
Yi1(0) (5)
Likewise for the high intensity partisan treatment, the direct ITT estimator can be iden-
tified as:
ÎTT (20),i1 =
1
m2
m2∑
i1=(m1+1)
Yi1(2)−
1
N1 − (m1 +m2)
N1∑
i1=(m1+m2+1)
Yi1(0) (6)
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And finally, the direct ITT estimator of the high versus the low intensity partisan treat-
ment is:
ÎTT (21),i1 =
1
m2
m2∑
i1=(m1+1)
Yi1(2)−
1
m1
m1∑
i1=1
Yi1(1) (7)
Similarly, the potential outcomes for i2 are:
If Z = 0, then Yi2(0) = 0 or Yi2(0) = 1
If Z = 1, then Yi2(1) = 0 or Yi2(1) = 1
If Z = 2, then Yi2(2) = 0 or Yi2(2) = 1
And the respective indirect unit-level causal effects τi2 can then be defined as the differ-
ence between two potential outcomes:
τ(10),i2 = Yi2(1)− Yi2(0) (8)
τ(20),i2 = Yi2(2)− Yi2(0) (9)
τ(21),i2 = Yi2(2)− Yi2(1) (10)
If we definem3 as a subsample ofN2 consisting of household members i2 of subjects i1 who
were assigned to the low intensity partisan phone call andm4 as a subsample of N2 consisting
of household members i2 of subjects i1 who were assigned to the high intensity partisan phone
call, then the indirect ITT estimator of assignment to the low partisan intensity treatment
can be defined as:
ÎTT (10),i2 =
1
m3
m3∑
i2=1
Yi2(1)−
1
N2 − (m3 +m4)
N2∑
i2=(m3+m4+1)
Yi2(0) (11)
Likewise for the high intensity partisan treatment, the indirect ITT estimator can be
identified as:
4
ÎTT (20),i2 =
1
m4
m4∑
i2=(m3+1)
Yi2(2)−
1
N2 − (m3 +m4)
N2∑
i2=(m3+m4+1)
Yi2(0) (12)
And finally, the indirect ITT estimator of the high versus the low intensity partisan
treatment is:
ÎTT (21),i2 =
1
m4
m4∑
i2=(m3+1)
Yi2(2)−
1
m3
m3∑
i2=1
Yi2(1) (13)
In Table A3 (Model III) in the Supporting Information we report the results from a logistic
regression model of turnout Yi2 on assignment to either of the two treatments (Z=1 or Z=2),
household partisan composition dummies, the interaction between treatment assignment and
household partisan composition dummies, a n-by-k matrix of pre-treatment covariates (X)
and the interaction between X and Z:
Logit Yi2 =γ0 + γ1Z + γ2(Labour)i1 + γ3(Unattached)i1 + γ4(Homogeneous)h+
γ5(Unattached)h + γ6Z(Homogeneous)h + γ7Z(Unattached)h+
ΓX + ΓXZ + i2
(14)
In Table A5 (Model V) in the Supporting Information we report the estimation results
from a logistic regression model of turnout Yi2 on assignment to either of the two treat-
ments Z (Z=1 or Z=2), the partisanship of the experimental subject, the partisanship of her
household member and the two- and three-way interactions between the treatment and the
party preferences of both household members. The model also includes a n-by-k matrix of
5
pre-treatment covariates (X) and the interaction between X and Z.
Logit Yi2 =γ0 + γ1Z + γ2(Labour)i1 + γ3(Unattached)i1 + γ4(Labour)i2 + γ5(Unattached)i2+
γ6(Labour)i1(Labour)i2 + γ7(Labour)i1(Unattached)i2 + γ8(Unattached)i1(Labour)i2+
γ9(Unattached)i1(Unattached)i2 + γ10Z(Labour)i1 + γ11Z(Unattached)i1+
γ12Z(Labour)i2 + γ13Z(Unattached)i2 + γ14Z(Labour)i1(Labour)i2+
γ15Z(Labour)i1(Unattached)i2 + γ16Z(Unattached)i1(Labour)i2+
γ17Z(Unattached)i1(Unattached)i2 + ΓX + ΓXZ + i2
(15)
CACE estimators treatment versus control group
Table A2 in the Supporting Information reports the Complier Average Causal Effects
(CACE), the average treatment effects for the subgroup of ‘compliers’ (Gerber and Green
2012, chapter 5). Compliers are defined as subjects i1 and i2 who live in households h that
would be successfully contacted if the assigned member was assigned to receive either the
high or the low partisan intensity phone call. We distinguish between Z, the treatment
assignment indicator, and D, a contact indicator reporting whether i1 in household h was
successfully contacted with a low partisan intensity (D = 1, short D(1)) or a high partisan
intensity phone call (D = 2, short D(2)), or was not contacted (D = 0, short D(0)).
Assuming one-sided non-compliance, the ITTD effect of treatment assignment (Z) on
receiving the treatment (D) equals the proportion of successfully contacted households
(idem). For both of our treatment groups ITTd = .45 (Table 1 in the manuscript).
The indirect CACE estimators of the two treatments compared to the control group for
individuals i1 can subsequently be defined as:
ĈACE(10),i1 =
ÎTT (10),i1
ÎTTD(1)
(16)
6
and
ĈACE(20),i1 =
ÎTT (20),i1
ÎTTD(2)
(17)
Similarly, the indirect CACE estimators for the two treatments compared to the control
group for individuals i2 can be defined as:
ĈACE(10),i2 =
ÎTT (10),i2
ÎTTD(1)
(18)
and
ĈACE(20),i2 =
ÎTT (20),i2
ÎTTD(2)
(19)
If Yi2 was turnout for the unassigned household member, then the spillover CACE model
we estimate can be formally written as:
Yi2 = β0 + β1D(1) + β2D(2) + µi2 , (20)
in which
D(1) = γ0 + γ1Z(1) + 1,i2 (21)
and
D(2) = δ0 + δ1Z(2) + 2,i2 (22)
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CACE spillover estimator treatment versus treatment
Since (1) one subject per two-voter household, subject i1, was randomly sampled to be
assigned to one of the three experimental groups, (2) the assigned subjects i1 did not know
in advance whether they were about to receive a high or the low partisan intensity call, and
(3) compliance for unassigned household members i2 is defined as living with a household
member i1 in household h who would answer the phone when called, it follows that the
share of compliers among unassigned subjects in the high and the low partisan intensity
call groups corresponds to the share of compliers among assigned household members. In
expectation, the share of compliers in both treatment groups should be identical (Gerber,
Green, Kaplan and Kern 2010, 302-305). Following Gerber et al. (2010) the latter "perfect
blindness" assumption can be formalized as:
(D|Z = 2) = (D|Z = 1) (23)
where Z indicates if subject i1 in household h was assigned to treatment 2 (high partisan
intensity message) or treatment 1 (low partisan intensity message), and D indicates
whether subject i1 in household h complied with Z=2 or Z=1.
If the perfect blindness assumption holds, then the indirect treatment effect τ(21),i2 for the
subgroup of unassigned compliers, defined as subjects i2 living in household h with
household member i1 who would answer the phone if called with the high or the low
intensity partisan phone call, can be identified as:
τ(21),i2 = E[Yi2(D = 2, Z = 2)− Yi2(D = 1, Z = 1)] (24)
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In Table 2 (Model V) of the manuscript we report the results from a logistic regression
model of turnout Yi2 on compliance with the high partisan intensity treatment D(2, 1) = 2
as opposed to compliance with the low partisan intensity treatment D(2, 1) = 1, household
partisan composition dummies, the interaction between D(2,1) and household partisan
composition dummies, pre-treatment covariates (X) and the interaction between X and
D(2,1):
Logit Yi2 =β0 + β1D(2, 1) + β2(Labour)i1 + β3(Unattached)i1 + β4(Homogeneous)h+
β5(Unattached)h + β6D(2, 1)(Homogeneous)h + β7D(2, 1)(Unattached)h+
BX +BXD(2, 1) + µi2
(25)
Randomization inference
In Table 1 in the manuscript, and Table A2 in the Supporting Information we report
randomization-inference based p-values and confidence intervals.
Estimating p-values
Following Gerber and Green (2012) and Aronow and Samii (2012) we first calculate the
differences-in-proportions between subjects assigned to treatment and subjects assigned to
control. We then simulate a large number of hypothetical randomization outcomes under
the assumption of the sharp null hypothesis that the Intent-to-Treat Effect (ITT) equals 0
for all subjects. If the ITT equaled 0 for all subjects, we could randomly reassign subjects
to experimental groups and estimate the ITT resulting from every reassignment. If we
re-assign subjects 10,000 times, we get the sampling distribution of ITTs under the
assumption of no treatment effect for any subject. We then compare the
differences-in-proportions estimate from our experimental data to the sampling distribution
of all differences-in-proportions estimates over all hypothetical randomization outcomes.
9
Estimating confidence intervals
We need to further impose the constant treatment effect assumption at the ITT level to
estimate confidence intervals using randomization-inference (Gerber and Green 2012, 67).
Following Gerber and Green (2012, 67-68) we impute unobserved treated potential
outcomes by adding the ITT we estimated from our experiment to the observed outcomes
in the control group. We then impute unobserved untreated potential outcomes by
subtracting our estimated ITT from the observed outcomes in the treatment group. We
then use this full schedule of potential outcomes to re-assign subjects to treatment and
control group 10,000 times. Finally, we list the estimated ITTs from each random
re-assignment in ascending order: "The 2.5th percentile marks the bottom of the 95%
confidence interval, and the estimate at the 97.5th percentile marks the top" (Gerber and
Green 2012, 67). The interpretation of the 95% confidence interval is the following: If we
imagine a series of hypothetical random assignments, 9,500 out of 10,000 random
assignments will generate intervals that bracket the true (population) ITT.
10
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Table A2: Direct and indirect mobilization effects, covariate-adjusted
Labour Rival Party Unattached Combined
Intent-to-Treat Effect
Direct Effects on Assigned Subjects
Low Partisan Intensity Call 1.8 2.4 6.0*** 3.8**
[-3.8, 7.3] [-2.2, 7.2] [2.8, 9.2] [1.3, 6.4]
N 996 1272 1607 3875
High Partisan Intensity Call 5.9* 1.1 3.4* 3.3**
[0.4, 11.4] [-3.4, 5.9] [0.3, 6.7] [0.8, 5.7]
N 997 1285 1566 3848
Indirect Effects on Unassigned Subjects
Low Partisan Intensity Call 4.5 4.6 6.6*** 5.4***
[-0.8, 9.7] [-0.1, 9.4] [3.3, 9.9] [2.9, 7.9]
N 996 1272 1607 3875
High Partisan Intensity Call 5.5* 3.2 3.7* 3.9**
[0.2, 10.8] [-1.5, 7.8] [0.4, 7.1] [1.4, 6.3]
N 997 1285 1566 3848
Complier Average Causal Effect
Direct Effects on Assigned Subjects
Low Partisan Intensity Contact 3.2 5.5 14.6** 8.5**
(5.5) (5.3) (4.7) (3.0)
N 996 1272 1607 3875
High Partisan Intensity Contact 12.5* 2.2 8.4 7.3*
(5.9) (4.8) (4.7) (2.9)
N 997 1285 1566 3848
Indirect Effects on Unassigned Subjects
Low Partisan Intensity Contact 8.6 9.8 16.7*** 11.9***
(5.4) (5.4) (4.7) (2.9)
N 996 1272 1607 3875
High Partisan Intensity Contact 11.6* 6.6 9.6* 8.6**
(5.9) (4.8) (4.8) (2.9)
N 997 1285 1566 3848
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, based on two-tailed tests, standard errors in parentheses,
randomization inference-based 95%-Confidence Intervals in brackets. Covariates are turnout in seven
previous elections, postal voter, gender, age and electoral ward.
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Table A3: Logistic and IV regression of turnout of unassigned subject on treatment assign-
ment of assigned subject, conditional on household party preferences
I II III
Logistic Regression
Results (ITT)
Telephone Call .764* 1.103** 1.582*
(.311) (.360) (.643)
Heterogeneous Reference
Homogeneous .375 .270 .277
(.235) (.267) (.279)
Unattached -.237 .141 .154
(.248) (.284) (.296)
Heterogeneous x Call Reference
Homogeneous x Call -.657* -.945* -.917*
(.327) (.378) (.378)
Unattached x Call -.412 -.592 -.606
(.328) (.379) (.380)
Instrumental Variable Linear
Regression Results (CACE)
Contact with canvasser .320* .357** .332*
(.134) (.120) (.168)
Heterogeneous Reference
Homogeneous .069 .051 .052
(.040) (.037) (.037)
Unattached -.066 .023 .019
(.038) (.036) (.036)
Heterogeneous x contact Reference
Homogeneous x contact -.278* -.312* -.323*
(.140) (.125) (.128)
Unattached x contact -.200 -.223 -.210
(.139) (.124) (.126)
Covariates No Yes Yes
Covariates x Treatment No No Yes
Observations 4930
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, based on two-tailed tests, standard errors in parentheses.
Covariates are turnout in seven previous elections, postal voter, gender, age and electoral ward. Includes
dummies for experimental blocks.
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Table A4: Robustness Check: Logistic regression of turnout of unassigned subject on treat-
ment assignment of assigned subject, conditional on household party preferences, 5-categories
operationalization
I II III
Logistic Regression Results (ITT)
Telephone Call .763* 1.104** 1.548*
(.312) (.362) (.651)
Heterogeneous Reference
Homogeneous Rival .385 .318 .333
(.258) (.297) (.302)
Homogeneous Labour .361 .207 .212
(.257) (.292) (.296)
Partisan x Unattached -.218 .158 .169
(.252) (.290) (.294)
Homogeneous Unattached -.641* .310 .317
(.286) (.330) (.334)
Heterogeneous x Call Reference
Homogeneous Rival x Call -.693* -1.067** -1.033**
(.341) (.395) (.397)
Homogeneous Labour x Call -.611 -.801* -.791*
(.346) (.400) (.402)
Partisan x Unattached x Call -.453 -.630 -.636
(.339) (.394) (.395)
Homogeneous Unattached x Call -.371 -.521 -.551
(.353) (.410) (.412)
Covariates No Yes Yes
Covariates x Treatment No No Yes
Observations 4930
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, based on two-tailed tests, standard errors in parentheses.
Covariates are turnout in seven previous elections, postal voter, gender, age, and electoral ward. Includes
dummies for experimental blocks.
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Table A5: Logistic regression of turnout on treatment assignment and party preference of
both subjects, and interactions between assignment and party preferences
I II III
Telephone Call .070 .038 .538
(.137) (.157) (.580)
Assigned Rival Reference
Assigned Lab -.184 -.031 -.030
(.302) (.347) (.353)
Assigned Unattached -.659** -.457* -.451*
(.196) (.225) (.228)
Unassigned Rival Reference
Unassigned Lab -.696 -.470 -.487
(.376) (.421) (.427)
Unassigned Unattached -.527** -.128 -.131
(.180) ( .210) (.214)
Assigned Rival x Unassigned Rival Reference
Assigned Lab x Unassigned Lab .829 .572 .591
(.484) (.548) (.556)
Assigned Lab x Unassigned Unattached .067 .188 .219
(.400) (.465) (.474)
Assigned Unattached x Unassigned Lab .422 .536 .576
(.476) (.532) (.538)
Assigned Unattached x Unassigned Unattached .053 .331 .346
(.275) (.318) (.324)
Assigned Rival x Call Reference
Assigned Lab x Call .228 .730 .685
(.482) (.557) (.559)
Assigned Unattached x Call .440 .634* .615
(.277) (.323) (.324)
Unassigned Rival x Call Reference
Unassigned Lab x Call 1.141* 1.354* 1.323*
(.473) (.541) (.544)
Unassigned Unattached x Call .092 .348 .308
(.271) (.315) (.317)
Assigned Rival x Unassigned Rival x Call Reference
Assigned Lab x Unassigned Lab x Cal -1.288 -1.820* -1.770*
(.678) (.780) (.783)
Assigned Lab x Unassigned Unattached x Call -.083 -.632 -.624
(.612) (.715) (.716)
Assigned Unattached x Unassigned Lab x Call -1.376* -1.722* -1.720*
(.622) (.709) (.710)
Assigned Unattached x Unassigned Unattached x Call -.210 -.437 -.447
(.398) (.465) (.467)
Covariates No Yes Yes
Covariates x Treatment No No Yes
Observations 4930
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, based on two-tailed tests, standard errors in parentheses.
Covariates are turnout in seven previous elections, postal voter, gender, age and electoral ward. Includes
dummies for experimental blocks.
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Table A6: Robustness Check: Logistic Regression Results: CACE of high vs low partisan
intensity call on turnout of unassigned subjects, conditional on household party preferences,
5-categories operationalization
I II III IV V
Partisan Phone Contact -.098 -.154 1.347 1.403 1.780
(.142) (.165) (.689) (.785) (1.370)
Heterogeneous Partisan Reference Group
Homogeneous Rival -.130 -.559 .776 .467 .593
(.369) (.432) (.622) (.686) (.693)
Homogeneous Labour -.291 -.844 .595 .018 .231
(.392) ( .466) (.623) (.708) (.720)
Partisan x Unattached -.567 -.636 .455 .451 .649
(.365) (.431) (.609) (.684) (.695)
Homogeneous Unattached -1.230** -.829 -.360 .035 .161
(.442) (.520) (.670) (.755) (.765)
Heterogeneous x Partisan Contact Reference Group
Homogeneous Rival x Partisan Contact -1.461 -1.753* -2.065*
(.746) (.850) (.877)
Homogeneous Labour x Partisan Contact -1.440 -1.414 -1.653
(.746) (.850) (.867)
Partisan x Unattached x Partisan Contact -1.721* -1.890* -2.232*
(.739) (.847) (.869)
Homogeneous Unattached x Partisan Contact -1.371 -1.381 -1.567
(.773) (.884) (.901)
Covariates No Yes No Yes Yes
Covariates x Call No No No No Yes
N 965
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, based on two-tailed tests, standard errors in parentheses.
Covariates are turnout in seven previous elections, postal voter, gender, age, and electoral ward. Includes
dummies for experimental blocks.
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Table A7: Comparison between official City Council elections results for May 2011 and
May 2012, and complete November 2012 Labour Party databasea (pre-treatment) across all
electoral wards included in the experiment
2011 Elections 2012 Elections
Official Results Labour Database Official Results Labour Database
Party support among voters (%)
Labour Party 43.5 36.0 45.9 38.7
Rival Party 56.5 31.9 54.1 31.2
Unattached - 32.1 - 30.1
Coverage of Database
N registered voters 70,443b 26,827 -c 26,827
% in database 38.1 38.1d
N of votes 27,626 14,579 22,371 12,921
Turnout (%) 39.2 54.5 -c 48.3
Note: Each electoral ward is represented by three city councillors, who serve four year terms. One councillor
is elected every year. In the fourth year there are no elections.
a The complete database includes registered voters with available landline and mobile phone numbers re-
gardless of household size.
b The number of registered voters is estimated using the number of votes and turnout in the 2011 elections.
c Turnout data for May 2012 City Council elections is not available on the Birmingham City Council website.
d The percentage of all registered voters included in the database is estimated using the number of registered
voters in the database and the (estimated) total number of registered voters for 2011.
Source: Birmingham City Council. Birmingham Elections 2011 and Election Results - City Council Elections
3 May 2012. Accessed 10 September 2015: http://www.birmingham.gov.uk/election
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Figure A3: High Partisan Intensity Script
 
!
2012 PCC Elections Calling Script 
 
When you make a call tick a box in the “Call Attempted” row. Do not leave an answer phone 
message unless it is the fifth call and we have not made contact yet. Do not call again if a contact 
has been made (i.e. the larger Question boxes have been filled in), similarly don’t write anything 
in these boxes unless you make a contact or establish that it is a wrong number. 
 
We have a message that we would like you to deliver. You can do it in a conversational manner 
but please do try and hit all the talking points in the message. 
 
 
 
 
 
Message: 
“Hello, my name is …. I am phoning from your local Labour Party. I just wanted to remind you 
to go out and vote for Labour candidate [candidate name] in the Police and Crime Commissioner 
Election on Thursday. Your local polling station is located at … during the usual opening hours 
from 7am to 10pm. Have you heard of the Labour candidate [candidate name]? 
 
Labour’s [candidate name] is determined to fight the Tory cuts to frontline policing that will hit 
Birmingham hard if a Conservative is elected. The Conservatives have sacked Police Officers 
and closed down Police Stations. In contrast, the Labour Party put more Police Officers on the 
ground and will protect police numbers. 
• Are you going to vote for a Police Commissioner? 
• Which candidate/party are you going to support in this election? 
• If there was a General Election tomorrow, which party would you support? 
 
Thanks a lot for taking the time to talk to me. 
 
Voice message: On the 5th attempt leave a voice message with the above content but without the 
ending questions.i 
 
Fill in the boxes 1 to 5 according to the criteria laid out on the next page: 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
i!Due to the limited number of volunteers there was a maximum of three attempts made at reaching subjects. Two 
hours before polls closed on Election Day, some volunteers started to leave a small number of personalised 
messages (addressed to the assigned subject) on mailboxes amounting to 16% of the treatment sample. Due to the 
fact that these messages were delivered very late on Election Day to phones that had not been answered after two 
attempts, we judge the probability that they significantly violated the exclusion restriction to be very low.!
Please do make sure to mention that [candidate name] is the Labour party candidate. This 
is to preserve the integrity of this experiment which will greatly help us in the long run. 
Q1! Q2! Q3! Q4! Q5!
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Figure A4: Low Partisan Intensity Script
 
!
2012 PCC Elections Calling Script 
 
When you make a call tick a box in the “Call Attempted” row. Do not leave an answer phone 
message unless it is the fifth call and we have not made contact yet. Do not call again if a contact 
has been made (i.e. the larger Question boxes have been filled in), similarly don’t write anything 
in these boxes unless you make a contact or establish that it is a wrong number. 
 
We have a message that we would like you to deliver. You can do it in a conversational manner 
but please do try and hit all the talking points in the message. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Message: 
“Hello, my name is …. I am phoning to remind you to go out and vote for [candidate name] in 
the Police and Crime Commissioner Election on Thursday. Your local polling station is located 
at … during the usual opening hours from 7am to 10pm. Have you heard of [candidate name]? 
 
[Candidate name] is a candidate for Police and Crime Commissioner and he is determined to 
fight the cuts in frontline policing. As [former role] [candidate’s first name] has a strong record 
in reducing crime and protecting our Police Force. [Candidate name] has been fighting for the 
victims of crime for over 30 years. 
 
• Are you going to vote for a Police Commissioner? 
• Which candidate/party are you going to support in this election? 
 
Thanks a lot for taking the time to talk to me. 
 
Voice message: On the 5th attempt leave a voice message with the above content but without the 
ending questions. 
 
Fill in the boxes 1 to 5 according to the criteria laid out on the next page: 
 
 
  
Please do NOT mention that [candidate name] is the Labour party candidate unless the 
contact brings it up or asks you which party he represents. This is to preserve the integrity 
of this experiment which will greatly help us in the long run. 
Q1! Q2! Q3! Q4! Q5!
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Figure A5: Questionnaire
 
!
Filling in Q1-5: 
Q1 tells us the status of the call so that we can analyse if and how contact was made. Use the 
following codes to indicate this status: 
1. Conversation with the specific individual i.e. you spoke to them and they 
didn’t ask you to “call back later” 
2. Voice message left; do not leave a message unless it is the fifth attempt to 
contact 
3. Wrong number i.e. number is for a different address/family or the specific 
individual has moved away 
4. Number not recognised i.e. line is dead or is a fax/modem line 
 
Q2 tells us whether the message was delivered in full; please use the following codes: 
1. Full message delivered 
2. Individual ends the conversation before you can deliver the full message and 
does not ask you to “call back later”; if you are asked to call back later leave 
all of the question boxes blank and we will call through the list again later 
3. Individual has already voted i.e. postal voter 
 
Q3 tells us if the individual is interested in which party [candidate name] represents 
1. Individual asks you which party [candidate name] represents 
2. Individual knows and mentions that [candidate name] represents Labour 
 
Q4 tells us how the person will vote in the PCC election. Please use the following codes: 
 L Labour 
 A Against Labour 
 D Don’t Know 
 X Won’t say 
 T Conservative / [candidate name] 
 S Lib Dem / [candidate name] 
  
 
 
Q5 IF the individual mentions that [candidate name] is Labour or asks what party he 
represents, please finish by asking which party they would support if there was a General 
Election tomorrow and use the following codes: 
  L Labour    A Against i.e. not Labour 
  T Conservative   D Don’t Know 
  S Lib Dem   X Won’t Say 
  G Green    V BNP 
B UKIP    Z Won’t vote 
Q2
! !
Q3!
Q4!
Q5!
Q1!
B UKIP / [candidate name] 
I Independent / [candidate names] 
Z Not voting in PCC elections 
J Will vote for [candidate name] specifically 
(rather than just the Labour candidate) 
O Will vote against [candidate name] 
personally (rather than just generally 
Against Labour [A]) 
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